

# Port – Rail Security Interface

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20 July 2006

# Guiding Questions

- 1. Describe the threats which you are most concerned about. During Intermodal transfers, are there additional which they must deal with?
- 2. What is the level of collaboration that takes place within their mode and between multiple modes to maximize efficiency and minimize vulnerabilities?
- 3. Do you view security enhancements as primarily an expense for your corporation or are you able to identify collateral benefits which add to the bottom line? Does the Corporation measure value in their security and preparedness efforts?
- 4. Much has been discussed regarding the ability of the nation to quickly respond and recover from a major incident. The railroads have always invested in, and have significant infrastructure, to ensure both a rapid response and recovery to all type incidents. What lessons have been learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?

# 1. Threats

- Access Control
  - Rail Access Coordination
  - Rail Crew Identification
- Imports (RPMs)
  - Locations
  - Effectiveness with STRADs and Rail Cars
- Exports/Empty Evac (????)



# 1. Threats

- Attitudes
  - Complacency
  - Resistance to Security Measures
- Commercial Impacts
  - Customer Expectations/Satisfaction
  - Competitive Advantage/Disadvantage
- Operational Impacts
  - Uneducated requirements result in operational changes
    - Resource intensive (Space, equipment, time, manning)

## 2. Collaboration

### ON DOCK


- Pier 400, APM Terminals, Los Angeles

### NEAR DOCK

- Detached - APM Terminals, Tacoma & Oakland
- Shared - North Intermodal Yard (NIM) - Port of Tacoma
  - Husky Terminals
  - Olympic Container Terminal

# On Dock Pier 400

- Access Control.
  - Gates
    - Pedestrian Access
    - Rail
  - Train Crew
    - Long Term Contractor
    - Vetted (Part of Daily Operation)
- RPMs.
  - On Dock
  - Wheeled





# On Dock STRADs

- Access Control.
  - Gates – Manned?
  - Train Crew – Confirmation?
    - Mobile TWIC Card Readers?
    - Vetting?
- RPMs.
  - On Dock?
  - Off Dock?



# Near Dock

- **Detached** - Limited Security Interface
  - Draymen are only Interface with Terminal Security
  - RPM at Terminal
  - Rail Line Responsible for Rail Site Security
- **Shared** - Complex Security Interface
  - Access Control
    - Multi-layered
    - Shared Facility
      - Multiple Users
      - Multiple Access Points
  - RPM Challenges



# Near Dock


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  - RPM at Terminal
  - Rail Line Responsible for Rail Site Security



7/26/2006



# PORT OF TACOMA TERMINALS






# Near Dock

- **Shared - Complex Security Interface**
  - Access Control
    - Multi-layered
    - Shared Facility
      - Multiple Users
      - Multiple Access Points
  - RPM Challenges







– Multiple Access Points



# 3. Security Enhancements

- Expense
  - Unprogrammed
  - Regulatory
- Collateral Benefits - Yes
- Measure Value (Constant Care)
  - Security Efforts
  - Preparedness



# 4. Lessons Learned

- Katrina/Rita
  - **Even before** KATRINA/RITA, Maersk/APMT recognized the need for coordination/pre-planning/partnership with USCG/Federal Government on threats to ports/vessel operations and issues associated with incident response & consequence management with port closures and measures for expedited port re-openings after an incident/event.
  - May/June 05 coordinated meetings with USCG
    - Aug 05 met with CDR, ATL Area (Vice ADM Crea) – All Hazard Contingency Plans (Pre-Katrina)
    - Sep 05 met with CDR, PAC Area (Vice ADM Johnson) – All Hazard Contingency Plans (Post-Katrina)
  - Lessons learned from Katrina included need for better communication, coordination, and validated the need for contingency plans.
- Tacoma Security/Emergency Preparedness Exercises
  - Structure – ICS
  - Communication
  - Mutual Support
    - FSO Groups - Tacoma/Seattle/Out Ports
    - Terminals/Rail/Trucking
    - Government Sector/Private Sector
  - Recovery
    - Most Difficult and Critical Phase Of Emergency Response
    - Least Exercised/Practiced Phase



# Questions/Discussion



7/26/2006