International Maritime Security Issues, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the International Counterproliferation Program

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What keeps you awake at night?
A Brief History

• The Cold War and the Arms Race
• End of the Soviet Union – December 1991
• The original problem:
  – 1990 estimate - approximately 35,000 USSR nuclear weapons
  – Early 1990’s – attempts to smuggle nuclear and other weapons materials from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
  – Late 1990’s - Unconfirmed reports of “missing” tactical nuclear weapons and radiological materials
  – 1997 - Russia declared an arsenal of 40,000 tons of chemical weapons. Only a small percentage have been destroyed.
  – Former Russian biological weapons production facilities still house some materials and production equipment
  – 2005 estimate - Russia - total arsenal of 16,000 nuclear warheads (7,200 active nuclear warheads; 8,800 inactive)
US Response to the Cross-Border Proliferation Threat

• US legislation - 1995 and 1997 - creates the International Counterproliferation (ICP) Program - geographic focus:
  – Former Soviet Union states
  – Baltic Countries
  – Eastern Europe
• ICP Program authorization expanded in 2005 – “world-wide”
• Joint Department of Defense, FBI and Customs program
  – Executive Agent: Defense Threat Reduction Agency
  – CSC provides much of the ICP program training
• 5 of 6 nations on U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism list have programs to develop WMD

• Growing evidence that terrorists are seeking the ability to use CBRN & E materials to cause mass casualties

• More than 25 recorded WMD (Chemical, Biological, Radiological) attacks to date

• Terrorists beginning to exploit maritime system vulnerabilities
Recent Maritime Terrorism Incidents

• October 2000 - USS Cole – Yemen harbor
• October 2001 – “Container Bob” – Gioia Tauro, Italy
• October 2002 – M/T Limburg – Gulf of Aden
Recent Maritime Terrorism Incidents

• February 2004 – SuperFerry 14 – Manila, Philippines

• March 2004 – “Trojan Box” – Port of Ashdod, Israel
A View on the Average American Perspective

• Most Americans believe a “WMD event” is unlikely – we underestimate the probability
• We have a tendency to overestimate the magnitude
• Result – denial and projection/displacement

How does this impact our security and incident response planning and resourcing?
European Perspective

• Europe familiar with terrorism – and WMD incidents
• Generates philosophical approach - “awful but inevitable”
• Accommodates a number of competing concepts
• Historical perspective impacts threat assessment
• Threat assessment impacts planning and resourcing
ICP Program Maritime Counterproliferation Training

- Weapons of Mass Destruction
- International Laws and Policy Efforts
- WMD and Terrorist Threats
- Smuggling Tactics – Vessels, Containers, Vehicles
- Ship, Container and Vehicle Search and Inspection
  - Planning
  - Hazards
  - Equipment
  - Techniques
- Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
- Physical Security Systems
- Port Security Plans
ICP Program Maritime Counterproliferation Training

• Policy level and operational/practical courses

• Interdiction/Detection

• Investigation

• Classroom with tabletop exercises
• Workshops with tabletop exercises, single country and regional
• Field exercises, single country and regional
Challenges

• Traditional smuggling routes

• Amount of smuggling
  – Cigarettes
  – Small Arms
  – People

• Many old ports at center of city limit physical security

• Some integration and data-sharing; much still manual and paper-based – limited “chain of information”
Challenges

• **Fragmented responsibilities and authorities:**
  – Customs authority limited to goods
  – Border guards focus on passports
  – Police have arrest and investigation authority

• **Customs focus on “lost revenue”**

• **“Stovepipes”** and limited information sharing

• **EU open borders**

• **Wide variation in capabilities**

• **Organized crime, corruption in some locations**

• **More reliance on people than technology**
What we’re seeing

• International initiatives

• Increased concern and activity

• Increased interdiction
Proliferation Security Initiative

• Counterproliferation partnerships focused on interdiction and disruptions of WMD and WMD-related material trade networks

• Initiated in 2003

• Several early successes in 2003
  – Uranium centrifuge tubes bound for Libya
  – Aluminum tubes bound for North Korea’s nuclear weapons program
  – Sodium cyanide bound for North Korea’s chemical weapons program

• Successful interdictions no longer publicized
Megaports Initiative

• Part of NNSA’s “Second Line of Defense” initiative
• Initiated in 2003
• Provides radiation detection equipment to key international seaports
• Currently operational in 6 countries
• Approximately 60 ports worldwide targeted for implementation
The more you monitor the more you find

- Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy official reported up to 1,000 cases of illegal transport of radioactive materials are interdicted each year
- Prior to portal monitors – virtually none discovered
- Much of the material is relatively low level isotopes
- According to one specialist, the contraband objects may simply have been added to the cargo by someone wanting to save themselves the cost of disposing properly of radioactive material that has outlived its usefulness
What we’re seeing (cont’d)

• ISPS implementation
  – EU regulation
• Identification of issues
• Increasing concern
• “Catch up” attitude
• Significant interest in basic tools and techniques
• Some countries making significant investments in ports to boost national economy
What we’re seeing (cont’d)

• Significant interest in identifying risks and vulnerabilities
• Significant interest in addressing vulnerabilities
• Significant interest in how to get the most improvement in security and economic benefit for the port/country for the money spent
Percentage Points of Improvement from Upgrades at Regional Facilities

Total % Points of Improvement

Total Cost of Improvements ($K) of Upgrades in Order of Most Cost Effective to Least
Security Investment Decision Matrix

- Empty Container Inspection
- Order Verification
- Metal Detection
- Encryption
- Bar Lock
- Data Validation
- Seal After Inspection
- Seal Verification at In-gate
- Seal Check
- Bolt Seals
- Tamper Indicating Tape
- 24 Hr Rule
- Verification of Product
- Credential Verification
- OSCPAT
- IT Security Standards
- Supplier Verification
- Validation
- Radiation Portal
- Explosive Detection (swipe)
- Radiography
- Driver Authentication
- EMS
- Third Party Inspection
- Process Standardization
- CSU/Sensors
- Eseal
- RFID (carton)
- CCTV
- Seal Verification
- Offload
- Exseal
- Seal Verification Offload
- Might As Well
- Do It Now
- Do It When You Can
- Forget About It
- Less
- Time and $
- More
- Security Effectiveness

Less Time and More Security Effectiveness
Summary

• The WMD threat is real
• The linkage between terrorism and WMD is real
• The vulnerability and exploitability of the maritime industry has been recognized
• International training and interdiction initiatives are responding to the threat and the reality – and having a positive impact
Questions?